BETWEEN RENAISSANCE AND COUNTER-REFORMATION:
SHAPING THE HISTORICAL MEMORY OF D. FRANCISCO COUTINHO,
3RD EARL OF REDONDO (1546-1564)

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ABSTRACT

Portrayed as a brilliant Renaissance figure that combined success in the military with the love for knowledge, D. Francisco’s patronage is well-known. This article compares the post-mortem written memory of Coutinho with an evaluation of the offices he held: the captaincy of Arzila (1546-1549) and the viceroyalty of India (1561-1564). The household and stay of D. Francisco at Arzila are analysed, as well as his strategy for recovering the royal grace, marked by his appointments to governor of the “Casa da Suplicação” (1559) and the viceroyalty of India (1561). At the viceroyalty, D. Francisco faced great expectations. Comparing Coutinho’s policy with the orders he received it is possible to ascertain whether the expectations of his appointment were fulfilled. This article reflects on the relations between different identities within the Portuguese Empire while focusing in a case-study of the shaping of historical memory.

KEY WORDS: Coutinho; house; North Africa; Court; “Estado da India”; historical memory.

ENTRE EL RENACIMIENTO Y LA CONTRARREFORMA:
CONFORMANDO LA MEMORIA HISTÓRICA DE D. FRANCISCO COUTINHO,
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RESUMEN

Retratado como una brillante figura renacentista que conjugaba el éxito militar con la pasión por el conocimiento, la labor de patronazgo de D. Francisco es bien conocida. Este artículo compara su memoria post-mortem con una evaluación de los cargos que ocupó: la capitania de Arcila (1546-1549) y el virreinato de la India (1561-1564). Se estudian la Casa y primeros años de D. Francisco en Arcila, así como su estrategia para recuperar el favor regio, que culminó con sus nombramientos a gobernador de la “Casa da Suplicação” (1559) y virrey de la India (1561). En este último destino había grandes expectativas por el desempeño de Coutinho; es relevante comparar las órdenes de la Corona para atisbar si tales expectaciones se cumplieron. Este artículo reflexiona sobre la relación entre las diferentes identidades del Imperio Portugués, al mismo tiempo que se enfoca en el estudio de caso de la construcción de la memoria histórica de Coutinho.


INTRODUCTION

Coming from a prestigious lineage, the Coutinhos, who in the XV century reached the title of Marshal of Portugal and became one of the utmost influential lineages due to creation of the house of Marialva, 3 D. Francisco Coutinho (1517-1564), 3rd earl of Redondo, lived in a crucial time when the Portuguese Empire was processing the transition to Counter-Reformation. Besides being lord of the house of Redondo he was as well one of the most prominent noblemen in Portugal. D. Francisco is generally mentioned due to the highly important offices he held: his North African captaincy of Arzila (1546-1549), his viceroyalty of India (1561-1564) and his role as a great courier of Kings John III and Sebastian. 4 Nevertheless, his governments were shadowed by misfortunes: at Arzila, a place that had been donated to the house of Redondo in 1490, 5 due to the royal order issuing its abandonment; at India, due to several political and military events and his sudden death.

Somehow, Coutinho is mentioned as the viceroy of India who supported both the poet Luís de Camões and the physician Garcia de Orta, in 1563, by patronizing the publication of Orta’s work. 6 Another field where D. Francisco’s action as viceroy is known is his conflict with the Jesuits and the Crown regarding the Counter-Reformist policies for the “Estado da India”, which motivated his statement to the King that he did not want to be taken for an Erasmus. 7 Still unstudied are the reasons of a somewhat traumatic loss for the house of Redondo: D. Francisco’s historical memory, a mention will be also concerning the political and military crisis of 1565-1575. Bearing in mind the controversies during King Sebastian’s reign over the implementation of Counter-Reform in Portuguese Asia, 12 it is pertinent to wonder if Coutinho was, on a certain sense, due to his support to Orta and Camões, a renascent viceroy in a time of Counter-Reformation.

In order to reach a full answer to this question and also to discuss the historical memory of Coutinho, it is relevant to study the three main stages of his career (Morocco, Portugal and India) that later were used to portray him as a successful leader. This study will be accomplished, in a first stage, by a short reference to the history of the house of Redondo and of D. Francisco’s action at the captaincy of Arzila. After the trauma that the withdrawal of Arzila inflicted on him and on his house, it will be possible to proceed to the second stage of his career in the court, previously to his appointment to India, which will also be fully detailed. Finally, for the third stage, an analysis on his viceroyalty of India will be made, focusing on the study of political and military events and on his polemics with the Jesuits and the Crown concerning Counter-Reformation policies. Ultimately, further debate on the significance of his patronage of Camões and Orta will be done. In order to achieve a final conclusion on the shaping of D. Francisco’s historical memory, a mention will be also made to his death and polemical inheritance for India, considering the political and military crisis of 1565-1575.

1. A TRAUMATIC LOSS FOR THE HOUSE OF REDONDO: D. FRANCISCO COUTINHO AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARZILA (1538-1549)

The house of Redondo descended from its first earl, D. Vasco Coutinho, who was son of D. Diogo Coutinho, Marshall of Portugal and himself a member of the house of Marialva. 13 D. Vasco acquired the title of 1st earl of Redondo, in 1485, by revealing to King John II (1481-1495) the conjuration of the duke of Viseu against him. At that date, he had already many privileges and was lord of Borba and Estremoz. 14 Alike his relatives from the house of Marialva, 15 D. Vasco operated a series of exchanges in order to concentrate his lands. 16 This took place since, in 1500, King Manuel I (1495-1521) donated Borba to D. Jaime, 4th duke of Braganza, when he reinstated the house of Braganza. Due to this situation, D. Vasco exchanged Borba for Redondo and Estremoz for Pavia and also received an annuity from the custom-house of Lisbon and had the earl title changed from Borba to Redondo. Since he was granted the captaincy of Arzila, he spent most of his time there alongside his family, 17 in a tradition that his successors maintained. This donation was quite important for D. Vasco’s house because it ensured military detachment for all its members and granted royal mercies.

When D. Vasco needed to come to Portugal, he entrusted the captaincy to his relatives, like his son D. João Coutinho, who became 2nd earl of Redondo, in 1522. Through a series of marriages with the Mascarenhas, the

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2 This article was written within the scope of a post-doctoral fellowship at CHAM for the line Renaissance Europe: the “Old” and the “New” worlds. In this article we use the expression “Estado da India” referring to the Portuguese ports network in Asia and as another asian power, as defined by Thomaz 1994: 207-208.
4 A courtesan source from the XVI century notes several of his “sayings”: Ditos…, 99-106.
6 Orta 1987: 3.
7 Marcocci 2012: 400.
8 Xavier 2008: 131.
9 Pelúcia 2018: 78-80.
10 Specially by Luís de Camões. For further details check points 3.3 and 3.4.
11 Within the same scope check an article on a Coutinho’s predecessor, Governor Francisco Barreto (1555-1558): Vila-Santa 2017.
12 By Counter-Reformist policies in the case of Portuguese Asia, we bear in mind the relationship established with Hindu, Muslim, New-Christian and Jewish communities as well as missionary strategy followed by the Crown and the Church. For further details on the subject check our article “Resistência e contemporização: tensões políticas na implementação da Contra-Reforma no Estado da India (1557-1558)” which will be published in the book of the International Seminar on Martinho Lutero e o Novo Rosto Político-Religioso da Europa.
13 Livro... 1996: 193.
15 Oliveira 1999: 78.
16 Semião 2002: 102 e 110.
17 Ibidem, 57 and 228.
Meneses and the Ataides lineages, but the house of Redondo ensured important connections. This is specially noted in the case of the Mascarenhas. If D. Vasco married D. Catarina da Silva, niece of the 1st earl of Cantanhede, D. Pedro de Meneses, his successor D. João Coutinho married D. Isabel Henriques, daughter of Fernão Martins Mascarenhas, steeds captain of Kings John II and Manuel I. D. João’s sisters also achieved important marriage alliances: D. Margarida Coutinho, married D. João Mascarenhas, son of Fernão Martins Mascarenhas who inherited his father’s office; D. Violante Henriques married D. Afonso de Lencastre, son of D. Jorge, duke of Coimbra and bastard son of King John II. These marriages explain why, in the absence of D. Vasco and D. João Coutinho, the captivity was usually occupied by the Meneses and the Mascarenhas, and above all, the very important role the Mascarenhas played in the military aids to Arzila in the sieges.

The failure and to provide offspring from the marriage of D. Guiomar Coutinho, heir of D. Francisco Coutinho, 4th earl of Marialva and Loule, to Infant D. Fernando (1507-1534), brother of King John III (1521-1557), meant that the representation of the lineage of the Coutinhos passed over to the house of Redondo, which originally descended from the house of Marialva. The constant Coutinhos’ closeness to the royal family also explains why D. João Coutinho, 2nd earl of Redondo and cousin of D. Guiomar Coutinho, tried to prevent, without success, the reversion of all the patrimony of the house of Marialva and Loule to the Crown, and also why he married his heir, D. Francisco Coutinho, to D. Violante Henriques, whose fathers were detached officers in the house of Infant D. Maria (1521-1577), sister of King John III. It is also plausible that D. João Coutinho named his heir as D. Francisco in honor to D. Francisco Coutinho, 4th earl of Marialva and the wealthiest earl of Portugal at his time.

Although there are no certainties, it is probable that D. Francisco was born in 1517. The first reference to him dates 1530 when he was present at a lion hunt near Arzila. But, it was only in 1532 that D. Francisco, accompanied by his uncle D. João Mascarenhas and his father, had his first military experience by attacking fiercely and placing in danger the loot from the Alcazar-Quibir alcalde men who threatened Arzila. In 1534, he saved many lives in another fight and even detached himself from his father. In this sequence, in 1538, when a truce was signed between the King of Portugal, represented by his father D. João Coutinho as captain of Arzila, and the sultan of Fez, D. Francisco signed as a witness. In that year, his father retired from Arzila after ending his second captaincy and because D. Francisco was too young to assume it, Arzila was entrusted to his uncle D. Manuel Mascarenhas. Due to the military emergence of the Saadid dynasty which threatened to conquer Fez and taking into account the close relationship D. João Coutinho had always maintained with this sultan, the royal ambassador to Fez, in 1542, stated that he asked for D. João’s return to Arzila since he preferred seeing it governed by a Coutinho.

But D. João Coutinho did not return and in 1543 the peace between Portugal and Fez was broken. However, the main threat to Arzila did not come from Fez but from the Alcazar-Quibir alcalde, rebelled to this sultan, who, in 1544, sieged Arzila and injured severely D. Manuel Mascarenhas. Once again the rule of a Coutinho was demanded but, for unclear reasons, D. Francisco did not assume the captaincy. Instead, in 1545, he participated secretly, without the formal knowledge of D. Manuel Mascarenhas, in the negotiations with the sultan of Fez for a formal alliance with Portugal against the Saadids, who had united southern Morocco and were threatening Fez. Although this alliance was not reached, D. Francisco played an important role in assisting his uncle in the attempt and in discussing with him the military raids.

D. Francisco was to be formally named as captain of Arzila only in 1546 after a probable return to Portugal. Although a source mentions that he started by going to Tangier as a royal punishment for a bad behavior that is not mentioned, the truth is that he signed his first known document as captain of Arzila on April 1546. The constant threats to both Arzila and Alcacer Ceguer, from the alcaldes of Alcazar-Quibir, Tetuan and Xexuan, alongside their intention to ally with the Saadids to destroy the sultan of Fez, explain why D. Francisco united his forces with Francisco Botelho, captain of Alcacer Ceguer, in order to clear up the threats in 1547 and 1548. Despite details are not well-known, there is information that in 1548 D. Francisco broke the siege of 2500 men that these three alcalds launched to Arzila. He also succeeded in preventing another siege from them to Alcacer Ceguer, defeating them a second time. These services ensured him a letter from King John III thanking his action.

On January 1549, when the Saadids conquered Fez and showed interest in occupying Alcacer Ceguer, John III ordered D. Afonso de Noronha, captain of Ceuta, to build a fortress at Seinal in order to protect Alcacer Ceguer.

28 Letter from Sebastião de Vargas to John III, Fez, 30.VII.1542 – Rodrigues 1915, doc. XXXVII.
29 Cruz 1997: 143.
30 Andrade 1976, part III, chap. LXXXXVI.
31 Letter from Sebastião de Vargas to King John III, Arzila, 15.XI.1544 – Rodrigues 1915, doc. XLV.
32 Letter from John III to D. Manuel Mascarenhas, Évora, 17.VII.1545 – Idem, doc. LII.
33 Letter from John III to D. Manuel Mascarenhas, 1545 – Idem, doc. LXII.
34 Letter from D. Manuel Mascarenhas to John III, Arzila, 13.VI.1545 – Idem, doc. LVI.
35 Menezes 1940: 80.
36 Lopes 1924: 385.
38 Lopes 1924: 386.
40 Vila-Santa 2011: 49-57.
At that time, D. Francisco warned John III that Arzila was weaker than Alcacer Ceguer and that the Saadids intended to seize it.41 In the wider context of the Saadids threat, who had conquered the Portuguese Agadir, in 1541, and forced King John III to abandon the Portuguese Safim and Azamor, the discussion in the court on other withdrawals restarted. Since the Realm lacked financial and military resources to maintain all the North African places alongside Brazil and India, the abandonment of Arzila and Alcacer Ceguer was debated as some stated that both places were military indefensible due to the lack of a port.42 It was in this context that John III, without consulting D. Francisco on the political decision of abandoning Arzila,43 probably because he knew he would oppose it, entrusted to his uncles D. João and D. Pedro Mascarenhas44 the delivery of a letter, asking for D. Francisco’s advice on how to military evacuate Arzila.45

Since the Saadids’ threat continued in the summer of 1549 and it became clear that the Seinal fortress could not prevent a siege to Arzila and Alcacer Ceguer, King John III appointed Luís Loureiro to evacuate Arzila and ordered D. Francisco to convince everyone to abandon it. The King promised compensations to D. Francisco’s house and to its inhabitants if they did not oppose his decision.46 Meanwhile, D. Pedro Mascarenhas suspended the abandonment since Muley Bouçon, brother of the defeated sultan of Fez, asked for the handover of Arzila and men to him in order to prevent a siege to Arzila and Alcacer Ceguer, King John III decided on abandoning Arzila and Alcacer Ceguer was debated as some stated that both places were military indefensible due to the lack of a port.44 It was in this context that John III, without consulting D. Francisco on the political decision of abandoning Arzila,43 probably because he knew he would oppose it, entrusted to his uncles D. João and D. Pedro Mascarenhas44 the delivery of a letter, asking for D. Francisco’s advice on how to military evacuate Arzila.45

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Although, the abandonment had been ensured, that did not mean the royal decision to evacuate Arzila, which was followed by the withdrawal of Alcacer Ceguer, was accepted by all. In this sense, D. Francisco who lacked his father’s influence over the King on such an important royal decision since he had died on September 1548,49 was not the only one to disagree with the abandonment. Lourenço Pires de Távora, the Portuguese ambassador to Charles V, found John III’s decision on Arzila strange and had difficulties in explaining it to the Emperor since Arzila’s strategic position ensured that the Saadids would have at their disposal another port to launch naval attacks.50 However, the withdrawal of Arzila was a traumatic loss for D. Francisco and had to be compensated by royal mercies.

2. BETWEEN ROYAL COMPENSATIONS AND DIFFICULT CHALLENGES: D. FRANCISCO’S COURTESAN CAREER (1550-1560)

The process of compensation to the house of Redondo for the loss of Arzila is linked with those regarding the confirmations of D. Francisco’s title and properties since his father had died. On 14th October 1549 and at the request of D. Francisco’s mother, the countess D. Isabel Henriques, King John III confirmed the revenues in the custom-house of Lisbon.51 The confirmation of other properties went on from 1551 to 1555.52 Amongst these was the most important one: the confirmation of D. Francisco as 3rd earl of Redondo. The process was not automatic since previously King John III had not confirmed all the noble titles depending on his personal evaluation. In the case of D. Francisco, his father’s services as well as his and the fact that he had the representation of the lineage of the Coutinhos, alongside his behaviour on the withdrawal of Arzila, explain why the King confirmed D. Francisco as 3rd earl of Redondo.

On 19th June 1549, when D. Francisco was still at Arzila, John III had already authorized D. Francisco to use the title since at this date he appointed him, due to his services in Africa, as badger of Salvador de Anciães, at the Christ Order, with the reference that he was already earl of Redondo.53 But it was only on 23rd November 1549, when D. Francisco arrived from Arzila, that John III formally appointed him as 3rd earl of Redondo and confirmed his annuity.54 In an attempt to reward D. Francisco, in 1551,55 John III granted new judicial privileges to his villages and also ensured a pension of 30 000 reais while D. Francisco was not appointed as badger of Vale de Reis, also at the Christ Order.56 However, the most important compensation to D. Francisco took place in 1551 when the King established a pension of 300 000 reais, with the possibility of transmitting to D. Francisco’s heirs, and secretly donated the captaincy of Arzila to the house of Redondo whenever the city would be reconquered.

However, there are signs that this was not enough for D. Francisco’s ambition since the King’s secretary wrote as an answer to a request from him that “His Highness excused the others things you have asked and has entrusted me to tell you that in no way he would do more on this dispatch than what he had already did”. Furthermore, D. Francisco could only share the secret donation of Arzila with D. Dinis de Lencastre, his daughter’s husband, with D. Afonso de Portugal, 2nd earl of Vimioso, with D. Pedro de Almeida, with D. João and D. Pedro Mascarenhas.57 Most probably D. Francisco demanded compensation relating to the patrimony of the house of Marialva, which had been integrated in the Crown, specially the properties at Mindelo and Leomil, from whence the first Coutinhos descended,58

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41 Andrade 1976, part IV, chap. XXXX.
42 Idem, parte IV, chap. XXXXI.
43 Ditos.: 100.
44 Galvão 1946: 154-156.
45 Letter from John III to D. Francisco Coutinho, 4.VI.1549 - Biblioteca da Ajuda, cód. 49-IX-36, fl. 334.
46 Andrade 1976, parte IV, chap. XXXXI.
47 Idem, parte IV, chap. XXXXIII.
48 Letter from John III to D. Francisco Coutinho, Lisbon, 2.VIII.1548 – Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (BNP), cód. 1758, fl. 2.
51 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo (ANTT), Chancelaria de D. João III (CDIII), book 15, fl. 129v.
52 Idem, book 61, fls. 86, 89v., 90v., 92, 93, 94 and 102 and book 54, fl. 299.
53 ANTT, CDIII (Privilegios), book 2, fl. 220.
54 ANTT, CDIII, book 61, fl 100v.
55 Idem, book 61, fls. 90v., 91v. and92. These privileges were enlar- ged with others before the departure to India on 26th October 1560 (ANTT, Chancelaria de D. Sebastião e D. Henrique, book 7, fl. 92).
56 The appointment took place on 6th March 1555 (ANTT, CDIII, book 58, fl. 250).
57 Rodrigues 1915, docs. CXII and CXIII.
58 Oliveira 1999: 45 and 78.
since in 1561 his relative, D. Lopo de Almeida, confirms that he was in Rome debating the issue with the Pope.\textsuperscript{59} Later on, Lourenço Pires de Távora, during his embassy at Rome, also took care of D. Francisco's requests on the matter,\textsuperscript{60} apparently without success.

D. Francisco's demands are also linked to his consciousness on the status he had in the court. This is confirmed by the fact that, in 1552, when Prince John married Princess D. Joana, D. Francisco presented to an annoyed Princess D. Joana, a Muslim that came from Morocco stating that since he could not be known as crusader against the Muslims, he preferred to present them.\textsuperscript{61} On July 1557, after King John III's death, D. Francisco was at the reception of the French and Spanish ambassadors, as well as in 1559 when the new French ambassador arrived.\textsuperscript{62} It was also during this period that most probably D. Francisco married his heir, D. Luis Coutinho,\textsuperscript{63} to D. Leonor de Noronha, daughter of D. Alexio de Meneses, King Sebastian's chamberlain and his cousin.\textsuperscript{64}

Taking into account that the Coutinhos from the house of Marialva used to be judicial officers, in the case "meirinhos-mores",\textsuperscript{65} the regent Queen Catherine, in 1559, appointed D. Francisco as governor of the "Casa da Suplicação", one of the Crown's most important courts. He tried to resist the nomination but the Queen forced him and he replied: "Your Highness, since you want this, I will do what you order me but I remind you that the governor asked to be earl and being earl you made me governor".\textsuperscript{66} It is possible that D. Francisco was asking to be promoted to marquis, something which did not happen. Succeeding D. João de Melo, D. Francisco had his first fire proof still in 1559. Queen Catherine ordered him to notify D. Teodósio, 5\textsuperscript{th} duke of Braganza, and D. João de Lencastre, 1\textsuperscript{st} duke of Aveiro and his relative since his sister and daughter both married D. João's uncles, to exile from the court\textsuperscript{67} due to the non-authorized marriage of D. Teodósio with D. Brites de Lencastre.\textsuperscript{68}

This was a crucial mission since as a political supporter of D. João de Lencastre, who defended the end of Queen Catherine's regency and the one of Cardinal Henry, D. Francisco was to be tested in his office. The fact that later on, D. Francisco was in 1560, appointed viceroy of India by Regent Queen Catherine, evidences that he was at the height of the Queen's expectations on the case. Yet, this did not mean that the 3\textsuperscript{rd} earl of Redondo forgot the loss of Arzila and did not continue to interfere in Morocco.\textsuperscript{69}

In a consultation during King Sebastian's reign of unknown date concerning the evolution of Morocco which had suffered several wars and the ottoman intervention,\textsuperscript{70} D. Francisco reproved the abandonment decision. He sustained that Arzila did not have a bad port, stating that this was the argument of the ones who had never been there and concluded that King John III had been badly counseled to sacrifice Arzila instead of Mazagão. Despite the wrong decision he considered that the Moroccan wars showed that it would be easy to reconquer Arzila. Even acknowledging the financial difficulties to do so, he still defended that Arzila could be reconquered with less expenses and taking advantage of the wars in Morocco.\textsuperscript{71} Although the formal answer to this advice is unknown, it is sure that Arzila was not reconquered and that when it was again donated to the Portuguese Crown, in 1577, D. Francisco had already died. However, this did not mean that the trauma of losing Arzila, despite all the received compensations, was not still present and a valuable argument in the search for more rewards from the Crown.

3. BETWEEN GREAT EXPECTATIONS AND DELUSION: D. FRANCISCO’S VICEROYSHIP OF INDIA (1560-1564)

3.1. An unexpected and new scenario: the appointment for India (1560-1561)

On November 1560, the Queen Regent Catherine and Cardinal Henry were looking for a successor to viceroy D. Constantino de Braganza, half-brother of D. Teodósio, 5\textsuperscript{th} duke of Braganza, who had been appointed in 1558. As Alexandra Pelúcia states, D. Constantino’s nomination was an extraordinary one since he had royal blood and was the most important nobleman to rule India without any knowledge of it. The orders given to him, in 1558, did not predict too many wars, although D. Constantino’s government became associated to the occupations at Daman and Ceylon and to the deepening of the Counter-Reformist dynamics.\textsuperscript{72} For the Queen Regent who was aware that from India, D. Constantino tried to interfere in favour of D. Teodósio,\textsuperscript{73} it was clear that his successor had to be at the same social level. Moreover, since Lourenço Pires de Távora had warned that some officials in Portuguese Asia would like to proclaim D. Constantino as King and separate from Portugal, although he did not believe D. Constantino would do so, the concern about the next nominee was not small.\textsuperscript{74}

Since the hypothesis of appointing Távora was put aside and D. Francisco Coutinho was a quite respected nobleman due to his services in Morocco and in the court, and was earl and lord of one the most important houses of Portugal, he was perfectly suitable to succeed the royal-blooded D. Constantino. It is also highly probable that for Queen Catherine the fact that D. Francisco was governor of the “Casa da Suplicação” meant his appointment would have a clear message for those in Portuguese Asia that dreamed of D. Constantino as King as well as a message for D. Constantino himself. In both cases, the message was clear: no autonomies would be accepted and D. Constantino would not have a pleasant reception at Portugal due to

\textsuperscript{59} Letter from D. Lopo de Almeida to King Sebastian, Rome, 3.IV.1564 – ANTT, Corpus Cronológico (CC) i-104-95.

\textsuperscript{60} Cruz 1992, vol. II: 96.

\textsuperscript{61} Ditos: 100.

\textsuperscript{62} Relações... 1937: 440-441 and 449-450.

\textsuperscript{63} Some letters from 1549 were sent to him by King John III relating the abandonment of Arzila (BPN, cód. 1758, fls. 13, 125 and 250).

\textsuperscript{64} Menezes 1730, part I, chap. XXIII.

\textsuperscript{65} Freire 1973: 410.

\textsuperscript{66} Ditos: 102.


\textsuperscript{68} For this polemics check: Vila-Santa 2018: 66-67.

\textsuperscript{69} In 1559 due to the Turkish threat to Ourão, D. Francisco helped the captain of Ceuta with his men (Vila-Santa 2011: 150).

\textsuperscript{70} Lugar 1992: 142.

\textsuperscript{71} Consultation of D. Francisco Coutinho to King Sebastian – Rodrigues 1915, doc. CXIV.

\textsuperscript{72} Pelúcia 2018: 77-78.

\textsuperscript{73} Buescu 2007: 340.

\textsuperscript{74} Cruz 1992, vol. II: 89.
his intervention in favour of D. Teodósio.75 Furthermore, D. Francisco’s personal connection to the rival house of Aveiro would also be a clear message to D. Constantino. All these facts explain the cold reception Coutinho gave to D. Constantino, once he reached Goa on 7th September 1561, aside his criticism on D. Constantino’s financial options.76

D. Francisco’s appointment had another huge advantage for the Regent: it diverted his house attention from an intervention in Morocco and from the topic of the royal compensations, in order to present him to a new scenario: the “Estado” where his uncle D. Fernando Coutinho, Marshall of Portugal, had, in 1509, been named to ensure the rule of governor Afonso de Albuquerque (1509-1515).77 Bearing in mind that D. Francisco did not give up his hope to recover Azila, for the Regent, nothing would be better than to send to India a dangerous supporter of the return to Morocco at a moment close to the Courts of 1562 which demanded that return. Furthermore, the Regent was also trying to create a new focus of action for the house and it must not be forgotten that D. João Coutinho, 5th earl of Redondo and D. Francisco’s son, would also be named viceroy of India by King Philip II of Portugal (1598-1621), in 1617.78

The orders given to D. Francisco can be deduced from his only known letter written at Goa after three months of government. The main orders were similar to those given to D. Constantino, although D. Francisco was given reinforced orders on the financial and judicial fields due to his previous office.79 Thus, the Queen expected that he could order the “soldos”80 and the concession of “cartazes”,81 end the practice of selling offices, cut expenses and send to the Realm a list of them. D. Francisco also received orders not to sell weapons to Muslims and to end the private business at Chaul and Malindi.82

As we shall check, D. Francisco tried to cut expenses, sent to the Realm the requested book of all expenses and of the “soldos” of the noblemen of India83 and this would be the basis for his successor, viceroy D. Antão de Noronha (1564-1568), to financially reform the fortresses.84 But D. Francisco’s departure was also marked by another event: the appointment of Sefer, by the Ottoman sultan Suleiman (1522-1566), as admiral of the ottoman fleet of the Indian Ocean.85 This appointment, in 1561, led to information that ottoman ships could attack from India to Mozambique,86 but did not proceed since he lacked the conditions. He also thought of vengeance that did not make sense,91 the truth is that he regretted the ambassador was worried that Francisco Barreto would rival him in terms of military achievements. Furthermore, D. Francisco became known as the “earl viceroy”, as he signed on his letter, in a clear intention to compare himself to viceroy D. Vasco da Gama, 1st earl of Vidigueira, who had been appointed in 1524 and who, contrary to D. Francisco, already knew very well India at his arrival.

3.2. The political and military events: Portrays of success or shadows of failure?

D. Francisco’s government dealt with several challenges which need to be studied in order to understand whether the “earl viceroy” did or did not fulfill the expectations over his appointment. His main areas of intervention were: Mozambique and the polemics on the intervention at Mutapa; the peace attempt with the Ottoman Empire and the delay on the Ethiopian affairs; the worsening of the situation at Malabar; the sieges at Ceylon; the delays on both Melaka and Ternate; and finally, the embassy to China.

The first topic D. Francisco dealt with was the Mutapian Empire. On his arrival at Mozambique, he found the “land revolted” due to the destruction of a mosque and arranged a meeting with its captain, Pantaleão de Sá, in order to discuss the works in the fortress which were late and costing too much. The viceroy even sent a new design of the fortress to the King and also had to calm down a Muslim ambassador that came to apologize for Father D. Gonçalo da Silveira’s murder, on March 1561, at the Mutapian court. The ambassador was worried that Francisco Barreto would be named to conquer the land. Despite, D. Francisco replied that did not make sense,94 the truth is that he regretted Silveira’s death due to their kinship, thought of vengeance but did not proceed since he lacked the conditions. He also made an “auto” for the King with all the information on the case.95 Later on, D. Francisco agreed96 with the Jesuits.

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discussion on the chances of sending more priests there and sent an embassy to Mutapa which failed. He, then, decided not to intervene anymore probably considering the powers given by the King, in 1562, to the new captain of Sofala and Mozambique, and also the royal orders not to send more priests since the land was to be conquered by an expedition coming from Portugal. Despite the unclearness of D. Francisco’s position, we think that he intended to force an embassy or the dispatch of priests to the region but found he lacked the conditions to do so due to other agenda issues.

One of these, and of the utmost importance, was the relationship with the Ottoman Empire. After the fear of findingottomans at Mozambique, D. Francisco was aware than an emissary sent from the governor of Basra was coming to India to ask for peace. At the beginning, the viceroy did not find a good idea to sign it, although he promised to submit the final decision to Portugal. However, there are good reasons to believe he changed his mind. When he was informed that the ottoman admiral Sefer could attack Portuguese merchant ships sailing from Hormuz to Goa, he sent D. Francisco Mascarenhas, a nephew who came to India with him named as captain of the sea of India, with a huge fleet to fight Sefer. But Mascarenhas delayed at Diu and Bazaim and Sefer escaped. Later on, the viceroy sent Jorge de Moura with another fleet. Moura fought with Acehnese ships near the Red Sea, but failed again to catch Sefer. These events gave fresh impetus on the reanimation of the Islamic commercial routes that competed with the Portuguese ones and were perceived as strategic defeats.

Due to this situation, on November 1562, the viceroy resisted in appointing a new captain for Hormuz and decided to send António de Azevedo to Istambul to negotiate a peace treaty with the Ottomans. Meanwhile, an Italian named Cuccino had been sent from Rome, by Lourenço Pires de Távora, to negotiate, on behalf of the King of Portugal, the peace with sultan Suleiman. The Ottomans offered the Portuguese the chance of establishing trade posts at Basra and Cairo and demanded in exchange trade posts at the Portuguese the chance of establishing trade posts at the peace with sultan Suleiman. The Ottomans offered Cuccino had been sent from Rome, by Lourenço Pires de Távora, to negotiate a peace treaty with the Ottomans. Meanwhile, an Italian named Cuccino had been sent from Rome, by Lourenço Pires de Távora, to negotiate, on behalf of the King of Portugal, the peace with sultan Suleiman. The Ottomans offered the Portuguese the chance of establishing trade posts at Basra and Cairo and demanded in exchange trade posts at Hormuz, Diu and Goa. The fact that the Ottomans court that supported an investment in the Indian Ocean was at the height of its power, being able to appoint the governor of Basra who sent the first emissary, meaning a new vizier favorable to this policy and convincing the sultan of the benefits of the peace. This had been the best proposition of peace ever to be made by the Ottomans to Portugal. Ambassador António de Azevedo and Cuccino met at Istambul, thus causing confusion, and sultan Suleiman sent letters to Lisbon and Goa in order to confirm the peace.

In spite of the pressure from the royal family of Hormuz to sign it, the defenders of the risks of an ottoman commercial expansion in the Indian Ocean prevailed both at Lisbon and Goa while sultan Suleiman died in 1566, causing the peace to fail. But it is important to stress that during the negotiations a status quo of non-intervention, previous to the battle of Talikota in 1565, had been reached between the Ottomans and the Portuguese, which led the first to give up sailing to the Indian Ocean while the second did not intervene in the Red Sea. This explains why D. Francisco evolved from his initial position and, mainly, why he did not interfere in the Ethiopian affairs despite of the wars in 1562-1563, with the Ottomans proclaiming a new emperor and defeating the legitimate one. Pressured to send 1000 men, the viceroy declined the request when he became aware, in the sequence of the defeat against the Ottomans, that the Ethiopian emperor refused obedience to Rome. Father Belchior Barreto stated that “I have fear of his reprehenision since I am messing in orders that were not given to me”. Even when Coutinho was threatened by the royal ambassador Fernão de Sousa, with letters to Queen Catherine and Cardinal Henry about not assisting Ethiopia, he did not give up his point that sending an expedition to Ethiopia would reopen war with the Ottomans.

At stake were also other problems he faced when he arrived Goa. The first one was the embassy from Ahmadnagar, demanding more “cartazes”, when he was informed that the sultan had sent an embassy to Istambul asking for a fleet to conquer Chaul. D. Francisco refused the request and, worried about Chaul, counseled the Crown to reinforce it, by conquering Ahmadnagar the “morro” in order to fortify and defend the city, or to abandon it. Further worries were also placed at Goa since the ambassador from Bijapur claimed for the restitution of Bârdez and Salsete but D. Francisco managed, with a reception at night, to become his friend and convinced him to give up such demands. Concerning Gujarat, which was in internal division, D. Francisco did not support the idea of conquering the sultanate and was favourable to sign peace with its sultan and not with his favourites, although he did not oppose waggling war with the lord of Surat. His concern was also at Daman, conquered by D. Constantino, who lacked military safety. On this issue, the viceroy’s trust in the new captain, Garcia Rodrigues de Távora, who successfully defeated the nearby invader abexins, ensured that he was seen as a prosecutor of D. Constantino’s policy in the region. Although some regretted that he did not visit Daman because if he did he would have conquered its lands due to

94 Letter from father António de Quadros to father Jaime Lainez, Cochin, 18.I.1563 – Idem, doc. 111.
95 Rivara, J. H., 1992, fascículo 5, parte 2, docs. 397-399 and 410-414.
99 Casale 2010: 112.
100 Couto 1974, VII: x, 7.
102 Casale 2010: 113-114.
104 Subrahmanym 2012: 167.
105 Thomaz 1995: 484.
111 Mendiratta 2012: 268.
his experience at Arzila, the truth is that D. Francisco was worried with the evolution at Malabar since it became the key-point area during his government.

Due to the growing difficulty in supplying pepper for Portugal, a problem that had been initiated on the 1550s due to the wars between Calicut and Cochin in the interior Malabar, D. Francisco promised to have always a strong fleet there and to force, in spite of the lack of money, Calicut to sell him pepper. This explains why he arranged the biggest expedition that India had ever seen to sign peace with Calicut. On December 1562, supplied with 3000 soldiers from Portugal, D. Francisco departed from Goa with 4000 men and 140 ships in order to meet Manavikrama of Calicut (1562-1574) and sign the peace. On his way to Tiracole, the noblemen found strange his attitude of not punishing the rajah of Cananor, accused of illegal trade and held responsible for the lack of pepper. Instead, the viceroy chose to organize a military ceremony with his ships firing while he disembarked his 4000 men to meet 40 000 men, thus succeeding in intimidating Calicut. After this event, D. Francisco went to Cochin to load the pepper.

At Cochin, the noblemen who had wanted war attacked each other, causing the death of 50 men, meanwhile the Muslims of Cochin killed the city’s governor, named by the rajah of Cochin, causing several disorders that D. Francisco was unable to stop. Instead, it was the intervention of the bishop D. Jorge Temudo and of Father Belchior Barreto responsible for reinstating order. Not even the appointment of D. Jorge de Castro, by the viceroy, in fulfillment of royal orders, as captain of Cochin to deal with peppers loadings would be enough. Not only the viceroy authority had been damaged with the incidents, but worse, Castro denounced the difficulties in loading the pepper and even suggested to Cardinal Henry that he should seriously consider delivering the responsibility to private merchants. All these facts, explain why the loaded pepper would not be enough for Lisbon’s demands during D. Francisco’s viceroyalty.

Aware of these facts and concerned that the Muslims displayed a growing slight towards the Portuguese, when the viceroy was informed that captain Jerónimo Dias de Meneses fought with several ships without “cartazes” that he suspected had been sent from Calicut, he ordered D. Jorge de Castro to confront the rajah. Since the rajah’s reply, that he was not aware of those sea thief’s and that he could arrest them, angered him, he decided to appoint Domingos Mesquita, to attack 80 ships with “cartazes”, that would sail North in the beginning of 1564, in order to check Calicut’s reaction. Mesquita not only sank 20 of these 80 ships but he also killed in cruel ways every Muslim he found. Some days later, the viceroy died at Goa.

If for the Muslims, the wars against the Portuguese due to commercial and religious motivations had not been solved in 1556, the same happened in 1562. The fact that D. Francisco, who once had said he did not come to India to rule for the Muslims, hastened the reopening of the war due to the commands he gave to Domingos Mesquita, affected directly his ability to intervene in other areas such as Ceylon. Not even the sieges to Kotte and Colombus, launched by the enemy King of Sitawaka, were enough to catch the attention of the viceroy since both sieges were resolved, without his assistance, by captain Baltasar Guedes de Sousa. D. Francisco was expected to continue D. Constantino’s policy at Jafanapatão too, but he refused to conquer it, since in 1561, he had already considered that Ceylon was not suitable for investment due to the lack of defenses and the financial expenses. Thus, when bishop D. Jorge Temudo pressured him once more to conquer Jafanapatão, he delayed the decision and only sent a Franciscan priest to the kingdom of Kandy.

The same impossibility of intervention happened at Melaka where, after the peace treaty with Calicut, D. Francisco wrote to its captain, to await him on October 1563 in order to conquer Aceh. Despite having spent the whole year of 1563 preparing for the journey, the viceroy did not depart apparently due to the need to spare ships to send pepper to Portugal. The works in the fortress of Malaka that D. Francisco ordered to be done had also been stopped at his orders due to the lack of money. Regarding Ternate, there is evidence that he sent captain Henrique de Sá, on September 1561, with orders to assist the sieged Christians at Ambon, in accordance with a local project of expansion. Although a year later he was accused of trying to avoid sending Sá because he did not want to assist Amboín, it is probable that he intended to support further expansion at Amboín against the strategic enemy, sultan Hairun of Ternate (1545-1571), since this sultan, on February 1564, made a donation of his Realm to Portugal, fearing a huge goese intervention. But, Coutinho’s death stopped his plans.

Finally, another area where D. Francisco’s action was expected concerned the envoy of an embassy to the new emperor of China. For this purpose, he had brought from Portugal a special gift and orders to appoint Diogo Pereira as captain of Macau or ambassador. He sent Diogo Pereira

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to China on April 1562,\textsuperscript{134} after considering sending Father António de Quadros, the Jesuit provincial of India.\textsuperscript{135} Pereira arrived at Macau on August 1562 and decided to be captain instead of ambassador while the viceroy received order, in 1562, to name Gil de Góis, Pereira’s brother in law, as ambassador. When Góis finally reached Macau, on April 1563, the Chinese authorities refused access to the Emperor since they considered the gift too modest and he was a born indo-portuguese. Thus, only in 1564 the first Jesuits arrived in Canton,\textsuperscript{136} after D. Francisco’s death, which means that in this area, contrary to what happened with the missionary successes in Japan during his government, the viceroy again lacked results.

We can conclude that militarily and politically, Coutinho’s viceroyalty was far from being comparable to the successes of his ancestor D. Constantino, despite these had been an important criterion for his appointment. The consequences of the delusion of his military government were very clear in the incidents at Cochín, in 1563. This explains the delusion of the noblemen with his government and should not be disconnected from Coutinho’s position towards the Counter-Reform policies.

3.3. “Do not take me for an Erasmus”: D. Francisco and the Counter-Reformist policies

In order to understand why D. Francisco wrote to the King, in 1561, that he did not want to be taken for an Erasmus it is crucial to go back to the appointment of the first archbishop of Goa, D. Gaspar de Leão Pereira, in 1560, who, for a long time, was one of Coutinho’s allies. Thus, to reason out this alliance, it is important to study the personal motivation of D. Gaspar who was himself an important figure.

His appointment happened after the first judicial process (the “devassa”) against the Jews and New-Christians of Cochín and Goa in 1557,\textsuperscript{137} which governor Francisco Barreto had tried to oppose,\textsuperscript{138} as well as the escape, during several years, of these communities from Portugal to India.\textsuperscript{139} Being chaplain and preacher of Cardinal Henry,\textsuperscript{140} D. Gaspar belonged to the spiritual circle of Cardinal Henry\textsuperscript{141} and had important connections with the Franciscans and to Father Luís de Granada.\textsuperscript{142} Thus, D. Gaspar was a respected confident of Cardinal Henry and the 1550 decade had proved that a religious authority was needed at Goa, due to the death of the previous bishop D. Juan de Albuquerque in 1553. In order to solve the many issues without having to wait for an answer from Lisbon,\textsuperscript{143} Cardinal Henry and the Pope forced D. Gaspar to accept the appointment as first archbishop of Goa.\textsuperscript{144} D. Gaspar failed to resist the nomination.\textsuperscript{145} In fact, his critics would state that the Crown had appointed a contemplative to such an important executive office.

Nevertheless, D. Gaspar departed for India with reinforced powers and with a clear centralized project,\textsuperscript{146} facing the challenge to rule over a huge dioceses’ and to convert a demographic majority of non-Christians while implementing Counter-Reformation.\textsuperscript{147} This occurred because there were several attempts to apply the decisions of the Council of Trent in Portugal even before it had finished in 1563, and Portugal became “avant-garde” in Europe.\textsuperscript{148} Arriving in India, in 1560, during D. Constantino’s government, D. Gaspar involved in polemics with the Jesuits. Although, he had a project to convert every religious majority, from Hindus to Muslims, to Jews and New-Christians, he was confronted by D. Constantino’s policy to rapidly convert Goa into a Christian island.\textsuperscript{149}

Thus, in 1560, having been invited by the Jesuits to baptize several Hindus at their College in Goa, D. Gaspar “mourned that the humility that had characterized the first Jesuits had been lost”, criticized the excessive apparatus and ordered the Jesuits not to interfere anymore with the baptisms that were under his jurisdiction. The effects of the conflict rapidly spread with the Jesuits accusing D. Gaspar of being responsible for a slowdown in the baptisms.\textsuperscript{150} This occurred because D. Gaspar became aware that in previous years huge numbers of people were baptized without being properly catechized and that forced baptisms were made when Father António de Quadros, the Jesuit Provincial of India, Father Belchior Carneiro and the theologian Francisco Rodrigues, with the support of viceroy D. Constantino, had been visiting all the houses of the Hindus in Goa ordering them to baptize and imprisoning those who did not accept it.\textsuperscript{151}

Defending a policy of sincere baptisms,\textsuperscript{152} clear catechisms and opposing what he interpreted as forced conversions, D. Gaspar was supported by the Jesuit Provincial of Portugal in his stand.\textsuperscript{153} However, at Ceylon, in 1561, he forced viceroy D. Constantino to destroy a Buddhist relic by denying the money offered by the King of Pegu for it and arguing that it was important to destroy pagan relics.\textsuperscript{154} Thus, his attitude at Ceylon provided him enemies. Although, he was satisfied that the Jesuits obeyed him\textsuperscript{155} and even wrote to the King of Portugal that he still intended to convert Goa but with different methods,\textsuperscript{156} the truth is that this conflict also had consequences for the Jesuits in Asia who did not...
accept this peacefully. As a consequence, Father António de Quadros intended to dismiss himself from the office of Jesuit Provincial of India and counsels were made for new authorized Jesuits to be sent from Portugal.

Arriving in the middle of these events, D. Francisco agreed with D. Gaspar and his theologians that D. Constantino’s law on the expulsion of Brahmins should be reversed. He cancelled it, on 3rd December 1561, arguing with the fear of a depopulated Goa. Moreover, during that month, D. Francisco wrote to the King that in a visit at Goa “behind the Hindus that were there I rectified some things that had been badly done and promised to do others”. Furthermore, he mentioned that he favoured all the Christians as the King had ordered him but also that he decided to ignore the Christians who escaped to Muslim territories, stating that “Your Highness will have to forgive me for this but do not take me for an Erasmus because I do not do more to them than to cover my eyes and nose”. Furthermore, at a time when the boundary between faith and religious crime was too tenuous, he promised to forgive the Christians who had wanted to return and defended that, as Father Francisco de Pina had done with two black men at Mozambique, refusing to baptize them without catechizing them first, “these are the Christians I tell Your Highness that I want”. He also added that he would support the priests with the same vision as his, ended up warning that “I shall forgive those who will complain about me” and ensured that D. Gaspar “serves very well his office and is fulfilling the royal orders” and that the King should not “believe in anyone that tells you the opposite”.

The alliance of D. Francisco with the archbishop was crystal clear. Since his arrival, the viceroy supported D. Gaspar against the Jesuits and promised to continue to do so. But why did he take this stand? It is possible that he had already met D. Gaspar in Portugal but we think that in the basis of this political and religious alliance with him are two aspects: both shared the same vision concerning baptisms and devotion and were clear supporters of the Franciscans. As we have seen D. Gaspar had connections with them and D. Francisco also preferred them and this explains why he ordered in his testament to be buried in the goese Franciscan church with their habit alongside the Christ Order one.

Although the viceroy shared the same spiritual orientation, it is impossible to deny his close relationship to his Jesuit confessor, Father Francisco de Pina, who ensured that he “prayed with such a devotion that he made me more devoted” and that he forced him to a second confession before entering Goa “looking like he entered not as ruler but as a dying pious man”. Moreover, he also granted his good relations with the Jesuits. But, ever since D. Francisco supported D. Gaspar, those facts changed since the Jesuits continued to accuse D. Gaspar of slowing down the rhythm of baptisms.

Their influence near the courts of Lisbon and Rome explains the letter from the King to D. Gaspar reminding him that all the previous rulers had been zealous in baptisms and that he had ordered D. Constantino to remove all the obstacles to conversions and so he did not need to remind him of his obligations and still trusted that he would do the best. On the same date, the King wrote to D. Francisco ordering him to counsel with D. Gaspar and the Jesuits in order to establish the strategy for the new baptized and asking for annual reports on the numbers of baptisms. The King also wrote to the Chamber of Goa asking the same. Meanwhile, the Jesuit Provincial of Portugal awaited instructions from Rome on the matter.

Once this letter was received by D. Gaspar, he called the Jesuits and confessing himself betrayed by the men who had convinced him to support the Hindus, authorized the Jesuits to restart the baptisms while Father Francisco Rodrigues and the captain of Goa were authorized to advertise everyone, on behalf of the King, of his letter to the Non-Christians of Goa. Although, D. Gaspar had been defeated and had to place his obedience above his personal opinion, which later on had consequences on his resignation of the office in 1567, Coutinho tried to maintain the same policy. In the meantime, from Trent, orders were given for a letter to be written by the Pope to D. Gaspar on the topic. Cardinal Henry was also asked to address a letter to D. Gaspar on the same thematic and the resignation of Father António de Quadros was refused. Rome was also aware that Coutinho was not alike D. Constantino and managed to send him letters from the King of Portugal and the Pope.

Meanwhile, at Goa, the viceroy attended another small baptism and imprisoned the previous captain of Goa, for opposing his intention to reverse D. Constantino’s policy. Actually, D. Francisco received a letter from the King ordering him not to allow the entrance of Jews from the Middle East in the “Estado” and to meet with D. Gaspar, the bishop of

165 Letter from father João Baptista do Monte to father Miguel de Torres, Goa, 12.XII.1561 – Idem, doc. 53.
166 Letter from father Belchior Nunes Barreto to father Jaime Lainez, Cochin, 15.I.1562 – Idem, doc. 69.
167 Letter from King Sebastian to D. Gaspar de Leão Pereira, Lisbon, 11.III.1562 – PUB. Idem, doc. 72A.
168 Letter from King Sebastian to D. Francisco Coutinho, Lisbon, 11.III.1562 – Idem, doc. 72B.
169 Letter from King Sebastian to the Chamber of Goa, Lisbon, 11.III.1562 – Idem, doc. 72C.
170 Letter from father Gonçalo Vaz to father Jaime Lainez, Braga, 25.VIII.1562 – Idem, doc. 75.
171 Machado 1736, tomo II, book I, chap. XV.
174 Letter from father João de Polanco to father Gonçalo Vaz de Melo, Trent, 7.XII.1562 – Idem, doc. 92.
175 Letter from father Jaime Lainez to father Francisco Rodrigues, Trent, 11.III.1562 – Idem, doc. 93.
177 Letter of D. Pero de Meneses to King Sebastian, Goa, 30.XII.1562 – ANTT, CC I:89-42.
Cochin, and the Jesuits in order to discuss the orders of King John III not to favour Brahmins and to encourage new baptisms.\textsuperscript{178} On that sequence, the viceroy assisted the Jesuits arriving from Portugal on September 1563\textsuperscript{179} but delayed, without explanation, the implementation of this order until November. Only then he gathered D. Gaspar, the other religious authorities, the Chamber of Goa and other officials, and after the preach from D. Gaspar against the Brahmins, he promised to adopt measures in favour of the Christianity, attending with all the noblemen of India to a mass baptism. Still he imposed that it would be the judicial officers to spread the news at Goa and not the religious officials, and after the preach from D. Gaspar against the Brahmins, he promised to adopt measures in favour of the Christianity, attending with all the noblemen of India to a mass baptism. Still he imposed that it would be the judicial officers to spread the news at Goa and not the religious authorities.\textsuperscript{180} This was done by a special provision from D. Francisco on 27th November 1563 that nullified his previous one, dated back 1561.\textsuperscript{181}

In this sequence the political defense of viceroy D. Constantino’s memory was again possible\textsuperscript{182} and the majority recognized that the letter from the Pope to D. Gaspar had been useless.\textsuperscript{183} But, regarding D. Francisco, could the same be stated? Bearing in mind that he resisted to apply the royal orders until the last moment, from 1562 to the end of 1563, we think that the Pope’s letter, despite being unknown, was necessary. Still, this outcome for D. Gaspar and D. Francisco on the Counter-Reformist policies should not be disconnected from the beginning of the regency of Cardinal Henry.\textsuperscript{184}

While governor Francisco Barreto opposed the “devassa” of 1557 and tried to protect the New-Christian and Hindu communities due to his sense of the strategic interests of the “Estado”,\textsuperscript{185} Coutinho seems to have opposed a full implementation of Counter-Reformation in Asia due to his personal convictions. At the time of Francisco Barreto there was no Inquisition and no archbishop of Goa. On the contrary, in the case of D. Francisco, this only detaches his opposition to the implementation of a full Counter-Reformist policy and raises the question on his motivation. As a great aristocrat, still embodied with the spirit of Renaissance, and despite his political defeat, Coutinho did not give up his view as his patronage clearly evidences.

3.4. The patron of culture: D. Francisco, Garcia de Orta and Luis de Camões

During his government, the 3\textsuperscript{rd} earl of Redondo detached himself from other governors and viceroys of India due to his known patronage. Since D. Francisco’s patronage in India is linked with the cultural ambience and political thought of the late Renaissance,\textsuperscript{186} this aspect needs further analysis.

If in the case of Garcia de Orta, it must be stressed that his support was given to an important person, in the case of Camões, D. Francisco became responsible for patronizing a poet who had not yet achieved recognition for his work. Having the reputation in Portugal to be playful, D. Francisco maintained this attitude in India.\textsuperscript{187} Thus, it is known that he used to play sports, although his health did not help, betting money, despite his nephew’s advice not to do so, since he used to lose.\textsuperscript{188} But, D. Francisco’s love for arts had deep seeds. Already in 1560, Duarte Nunes de Leão, an officer from the “Casa da Suplicação”, had dedicated him his book, arguing on D. Francisco’s high valor as a military commander as well as an exemplar top judicial officer and man of culture.\textsuperscript{189} On this sense it is not surprising to find that he departed to India with several musicians and used to sing.\textsuperscript{190}

If all these facts point to his cultural interests, his relation with Camões proves it even better. At a time when Camões was a poet-soldier, had not yet published the Lusiadas and had to fight for his recognition as a poet amongst other candidates, he sought D. Francisco’s protection aware of his influence and love for culture. Thus, he started by dedicating a poem to the viceroy begging for his protection against a feared soldier of India.\textsuperscript{191} Probably in reply to this request, D. Francisco sent another poem to Camões censuring his previous option of having the ears of Linhares patronizing him.\textsuperscript{192} But specialists consider that after this Coutinho accepted Camões offer to sing his deeds.\textsuperscript{193}

On his first poem, Camões started by saying that D. Francisco “deserves the name of King”, since the office of viceroy was too low for him and praised his fame as well that of his antecessors to end up with the promise to be his faithful ally in reporting in poetry all his military successes. In another poem, Camões provoked his playful side but also mentioned his wealth and reputation as a man of justice.\textsuperscript{194} The poet also dedicated a poem to his father, although this was not as eulogistic as those dedicated to the son.\textsuperscript{195}

Due to the close relation Camões developed with the viceroy, he was able to help his friend, the physician Garcia de Orta, on his attempt to publish his book about medicine. Although, Orta, in spite of his father’s Jewish origin, had gathered the support of several rulers of India, from governor Martim Afonso de Sousa to viceroy D. Constantino, and was, as an ancient Professor in Lisbon, a respected person in India,\textsuperscript{196} he had not yet achieved the publication of his book. Camões intervened near D. Francisco with a huge poem that would be his first one to be published when Orta’s book was released in 1563,\textsuperscript{197} in which he praised the Coutinhos’ lineage reputation, mentioned the great expectations...
surrounding D. Francisco’s plans against Gujarat and Aceh, and begged him to favour the old sciences, represented by Orta, promising that by supporting him he would become immortal and equal in reputation to the ancient Greeks.198

D. Francisco accepted to patronize Orta’s work by issuing a provision, on 5th November 1562, in which he argued on the book’s need and on the prestige of Orta to authorize it. This provision was also published with the book.199 Despite, Orta dedicated his book to his formal master Martim Afonso de Sousa, we believe that he recognized the true importance of D. Francisco’s support. At a time when the Inquisition was already in India200 and archbishop D. Gaspar had special powers over it, defending the persecution to Jews and New-Christians,201 organizing the self-faiths at Goa in the presence of D. Francisco202 and contributing to the affirmation of the Inquisition of India as a lab of experiments for Portugal in which mission and persecution messed themselves,203 Coutinho’s support came at the right time.

Despite the clear importance of Orta’s book at his time and its support by the Jesuits, the Franciscans and of the inquisitor Alexio Dias Falcão, it is important to bear in mind that Orta’s book was the only one of his time not to be supervised by archbishop D. Gaspar and that after Orta’s death, in 1568, his sister was burned by the Inquisition of India, in 1569, due to her Jewish ascendance.204 If it is true that by patronizing Orta, D. Francisco was also winning a place in History as his patron, independently on his military and political successes,205 it is no less true that very difficulty Orta’s book could be published without problems, before his death, during a government such as the one of D. Francisco’s successor, D. Antão de Noronha, who witnessed the hardening of counter-reformist policies.206

For D. Francisco, supporting both Camões and Orta was not only a natural stand and the probable continuation of what other Coutinhos had already done, but it had a clear advantage: that of portraying a better image of himself, especially considering the opposition he faced, the feeling of delusion his government inspired and the problems he left in Portuguese Asia to be solved with his quick disappearance.

3.5. A sudden and mysterious death: D. Francisco’s polemical legacy for India

On 19th February 1564, the “earl viceroy” was found dead in his bed at Goa. Although, some sources state that he was ill since 1561,207 others link his death to the arriving news about captain Mesquita’s action208 and other witnesses stress that he “died rapidly being found in a morning in his bed which caused several judgments surrounding his death but no one knew exactly what had happened”.209 Another report states that “being in strong health, he was found dead in his bed at Goa in a morning without anyone from his house being able to explain what had happened, which caused several suspicions and theories”.210 D. Francisco’s successor, governor João de Mendonça, wrote that he “died from a too confuse and fast death that I would not dare tell Your Highness since I think it is not my obligation to do so”.211 For these reasons, a special courier had been sent, by land, from Hormuz, to Portugal.212

Effectively, the circumstances of Coutinho’s death hovered over several critics on his government, which explains why governor Mendonça did not open an inquiry on it. Despite being plausible that on his letter from 1561,213 the viceroy evidenced a sincere will and zeal to serve the King, the truth is that his government was more criticized than praised and the tendency to praise started only after his death. The only contemporary exceptions were the Mercy of Goa, who praised D. Francisco’s good intentions and zeal at the beginning,214 and a spy who praised his discretion.215

Father Belchior Barreto not only criticized D. Francisco for not assisting Ethiopia but wrote also that India had “a bad government” under his rule216 and he was not the only Jesuit to criticize him.217 His successor João de Mendonça also complained for his delays, even at his request in the departure of fleets to Malabar and Ceylon.218 Belchior Serrão, the viceroy’s secretary, who had been appointed by him to the financial matters on September 1562,219 states that he did not believe in anyone and was ruling badly in his last months.220 D. Duarte de Eça, a good representative of the noblemen’s expectations, wrote that his government lacked events to report even stating he faced military defeat against Calicut in 1562.221 D. Antão de Noronha, the new viceroy of India appointed by Queen Catherine and Regent Cardinal Henry arrived at India on September 1564, charged Coutinho for the explosive war he found at Cananor and condemned him for authorizing Domingos Mesquita’s action which had raised all of Malabar against the Portuguese. Due to the serious situation he found, he suggested that the

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200 Eça 1979: 15.
201 Vallignano 1944, Part II, chap. 18: 469.
205 Letter from the Mercy of Goa to King Sebastian, Goa, 3.XI.1561 – Documentação... 1994, doc. 60.
208 Vallignano 1944, part II, chap. 18.
211 Carvalho 2015a: 144 and 155.
212 Carvalho 2015b: 70.
214 Letter from D. Antão de Noronha to Queen Catherine, Goa, 30.XII.1562 – As Gavetas... 1962, doc. 2067.
Queen opened an inquiry on D. Francisco's government. But what was the exact legacy of Coutinho for the "Estado"?

On March 1564, when João de Mendonça assumed the government, due to the absence of D. Antão de Noronha, the first to be named to succeed D. Francisco, and after the non-appointment in the royal orders of Pero Barreto Rolim and D. Francisco Mascarenhas, immediate measures were taken to assist Ceylon and Malabar. The governor sent reinforcements to Malabar due to the war at Cananor, and imprisoned captain Mesquita, due to the ambassador's protests, ending up freeing and thanking him with huge mercies after their departure. Himself a previous captain of Melaka, João de Mendonça promised not to delay the journey to Aceh and begged, without success, not to be a transitory governor requesting authorization to rule for three years in order to recover the “Estado”.

Despite the opposition D. Francisco faced in India, the lack of pepper loads to Lisbon in 1562 and the bad information that captain António Mendes de Castro gave to Queen Catherine after his arrival to Portugal in 1563, regarding the disorders at Cochin, the siege of Koulan and the threat by Aceh to Melaka which caused captain D. Diogo de Meneses to warn the Queen through him, the Regent Cardinal Henry ordered that, in case of D. Antão's death during his voyage to India, D. Francisco should remain as viceroy. This fact clearly shows that Lisbon still trusted him.

But this does not mean that Coutinho was a successful ruler since the conclusion that he left India worse than he received is almost obvious, even considering the apparatus of his peaceful journey to Calicut in 1562. Thus, viceroy D. Antão had some reason in claiming his responsibilities on the situation he found when he arrived Goa. His minor successes against the Ottomans or at Daman did not make up for Malabar. They explain why chronicler Diogo do Couto, who met him personally during his government, stated that he was “a friend of justice and tried to work in order that everything would be well done”, although he did not mention his patronage of Garcia de Orta and Luís de Camões, Couto's personal friend. His statement that his death caused “sadness because he was very well seen by all” is denied by all the other contemporary testimonies.

Nevertheless, Couto’s statement and sympathy for D. Francisco, also evident in his first Soldado Prático, should not be disconnected from later attempts to recover his historical memory such as the one from Diogo Barbosa Machado, on the XVII century, defending that D. Francisco had always served well, although his government was not clearly successful since he died too soon. On an opposite side was D. Francisco's patronage of Orta and Camões. Was that patronage a simple attempt to recover his image as viceroy or was, indeed, D. Francisco Coutinho a renascent viceroy of India in the time of Counter-Reformation?

CONCLUSION

Coutinho’s political and military options for India influenced the emergence of the 1565-1575 crisis since his policy was unable to ensure enough pepper for Lisbon and failed to achieve peace at Malabar. The same can also be said for his policies concerning the application of Counter-Reformation to Portuguese Asia since his successor D. Antão de Noronha did not to have the slightest margin to oppose those policies. Although Noronha was close to the Jesuits, on his arrival to India in 1564, he also became worried over the effects of mass baptisms on the depopulation of Goa. Due to this he managed to reverse the policy but ended up being the viceroy who ordered the further burn down of several Hindu temples at Goa and the one who approved all the main measures decided by the first provincial council of India, in 1567, gathered to discuss the application of Trent decrees to India. The fact that D. Antão as well had been appointed by Regent Cardinal Henry with orders to apply Trent to the missions of India, also gave him little room for action. Moreover, the circumstance that he succeeded a viceroy like Coutinho, who in vain tried to oppose the hardening of Counter-Reformist policies and became known for that, only worsened his position.

In fact, having been clearly defeated by the Jesuits’, the King’s and the Pope’s orders, and having even lost archbishop D. Gaspar’s initial support, we might say that D. Francisco’s political defeat influenced his successor’s ability to oppose the hardening of Counter-Reformist policies. Although, Coutinho resisted as long as he could to implement those measures, he ended up like governor Francisco Barreto, supporting them, by restarting the mass baptisms. Expected, by the noblemen of India, to be an expansionist viceroy, like his ancestor D. Constantino, D. Francisco’s governance became associated with the exactly opposite image: that of the viceroy who disillusioned his contemporaries since he did not detach with a big conquest in the North, at Ceylon or at Aceh, as was expected by his reputation and military experience. Thus, the “earl viceroy” was associated with the cut of expenses, the defeats at Malabar and, most important of all, with the rethinking of the “Estado’s” in a shirking logic. These facts explain D. Francisco’s interest in using his patronage to Luís de Camões and Garcia de Orta to improve his image near that same nobility but, above all, in the face of History.

On this sense, it was not only the government of India which needed his concern since D. Francisco’s very less years at the captaincy of Azilza and its order of abandonment also

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222 Letter from D. Antão de Noronha to Queen Catherine, Goa, 30.XII.1562 – As Gavetas..., doc. 2067.
223 Succession order to D. Francisco Mascarenhas, Lisbon, I.III.1562 – ANTT, CC I-105-101.
224 Succession order to Pero Barreto Rolim, Lisbon, I.III.1562 – ANTT, CC I-106-103.
225 Letter from João de Mendonça to King Sebastião, Goa, 4.III.1564 – ANTT, CC I-10-40.
227 Letter from João de Mendonça to King Sebastião, Goa, 4.III.1564 – ANTT, CC I-10-40.
228 Letter from D. Jorge de Sousa to Queen Catherine, Terceira, 8.VIII.1562 – ANTT, CC I-106-135.
230 Letter to Emanuel Leitão, Lisbon, 8.III.1564 – As Gavetas..., doc. 2968.
232 Machado 1736, tomo II, book II, chap. VIII.
233 Letter from D. Antão de Noronha to Queen Catherine, Goa, 1.III.1562 (Rivara 1992, doc. 507).
234 The fact that D. Antão de Noronha did not to have the slightest margin to oppose those policies. Although Noronha was close to the Jesuits, on his arrival to India in 1564, he also became worried over the effects of mass baptisms on the depopulation of Goa. Due to this he managed to reverse the policy but ended up being the viceroy who ordered the further burn down of several Hindu temples at Goa and the one who approved all the main measures decided by the first provincial council of India, in 1567, gathered to discuss the application of Trent decrees to India. The fact that D. Antão as well had been appointed by Regent Cardinal Henry with orders to apply Trent to the missions of India, also gave him little room for action. Moreover, the circumstance that he succeeded a viceroy like Coutinho, who in vain tried to oppose the hardening of Counter-Reformist policies and became known for that, only worsened his position.
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N. VILA-SANTA, BETWEEN RENAISSANCE AND COUNTER-REFORMATION: SHAPING THE HISTORICAL MEMORY OF D. FRANCISCO COUTINHO...
placed him in a low level in comparisons with his father and grand-fathers. Even his difficulties in improving the status of his house at the court of Kings John III and Sebastian, as his attempts to recover the patrimony from the Coutinhos of the house of Marialva evidence, prove that same concern by D. Francisco.

In fact, when observing the three main stages of his career (Morocco, Portugal and India) it is possible to conclude that the 3rd earl of Redondo did not enjoy the same hopeful times of his ancestors. This in turn affected D. Francisco's attempts to change his image during his lifetime since he felt he had not only to honor the Coutinhos lineage but also to rival with his ancestors memory. In this sense, we might raise the possibility that he may have intentionally wanted to be portrayed for History not only as the patron of García de Orta and Luís de Camões, but also as the viceroy of India at the time of Counter-Reformation who was the highest nobleman that had tried to oppose the deepening of Counter-Reformist policies.

It is exactly on this sense and based on his personal political approach to religious polemics in India, that D. Francisco’s affirmation that he did not want to be taken by an Erasmus can be enlightening. Taking into account his policy regarding Counter-Reformation, from his opposition to the Jesuits, to his alliance with archbishop D. Gaspar to his patronage of Orta and Camões, it is possible that his affirmation did not only refer to the problem of the Christians who ran to Muslim territories, but was, somehow, a metaphor to his personal view of the transitions that were happening in Portugal and its empire regarding the application of Counter-Reformation. Also, by writing it to the King, D. Francisco was probably assuming his own conscience that there were already people who saw him as a divergent Erasmus or people that would think that from him once they heard of his action. Thus, although trying to avoid confusion with the historical memory of Erasmus, D. Francisco ended up being associated as “divergent” and it is exactly on that sense that, compared to other viceroys of India, he may have been a “renascent” viceroy in the time of Counter-Reformation.


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